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1 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
July 3, 1989. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether under the facts of this case, the trial court 
abused its discretion by awarding the Defendant temporary alimony 
in the amount of $1,100.00 per month. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its characterization of 
certain property as non-marital property. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in the value ascribed to 
certain marital property. 
4. Whether under the facts of this case, the property 
awarded to the Defendant constituted an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. 
5. Whether under the facts of this case, the trial court 
abused its discretion by not awarding the Defendant her attorney's 
and expert witness fees. 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
All determinative authority is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit A and by reference made a part hereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 28, 1987, Anthony W. Rudman, Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant (Mr. Rudman), filed a complaint against Evelyn 
W. Rudman, Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Respondent (Mrs. Rudman), 
seeking a decree of divorce and a division of the property and 
obligations of the parties. Record at 2-8. On May 7, 1987, Mrs. 
Rudman filed an answer and counterclaim against Mr. Rudman seeking 
a decree of divorce, an equitable division of the property and 
obligations of the parties, temporary and permanent alimony and 
attorney's fees. Record at 27-35. 
On September 29, 1987, the trial court awarded Mrs. Rudman 
temporary alimony in the amount of $1,500.00 per month. Record at 
102 and 117-8. On three separate occasions, Mrs. Rudman was 
required to file a motion to have the trial court order Mr. Rudman 
to pay the temporary alimony and hold him in contempt. Record at 
109, 156 and 196. During the course of discovery, Mrs. Rudman was 
required to file two motions to compel Mr. Rudman's responses to 
discovery requests. Record at 136 and 279. In each case, Mr. 
Rudman was not ordered to pay Mrs. Rudman's attorney's fees for 
having to bring those motions. 
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The trial of this action commenced on August 18, 1988, before 
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District Judge. During the 
morning session of the trial, Mr. Rudman presented evidence and the 
trial court heard argument from counsel for both of the parties 
regarding a prenuptial agreement entered into by the parties. 
Exhibit 41.1 At the request of the parties, the trial court 
immediately ruled on whether the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous 
and whether parole evidence was necessary to determine the intent 
of the parties with respect thereto. The trial court ruled that 
the prenuptial agreement was not ambiguous and that parole evidence 
was not required for the trial court to interpret the prenuptial 
agreement. Based on the trial court's ruling, the parties moved 
to continue the trial so that additional discovery could be 
conducted and additional preparation could be made. Transcript, 
Vol. I, p. 53-61.2 
On August 22, 1988, the trial court issued its Ruling 
Clarification regarding the prenuptial agreement. Record at 244-
7.3 After several continuances, the trial resumed on April 4, 5, 
*A copy of the Prenuptial Agreement is attached as Exhibit E. 
2The transcript consists of five volumes. Subsequent citation 
to the transcript will be referenced by volume and page number. 
3A copy of the Ruling Clarification is attached as Exhibit F. 
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11 and 12, 1989. On April 28, 1989, the trial court issued its 
Memorandum Decision. Record at 350-60.4 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce were submitted to the trial court by Mr. Rudman's 
counsel on June 20, 1989. Record at 377-96. After retaining new 
counsel, Mrs. Rudman filed a Notice of Objection to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on 
June 28, 1989. Record at 370-3. The trial court denied the 
modifications requested by Mrs. Rudman to the proposed pleadings. 
On July 3, 1989, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Record at 377-96.5 On 
August 1, 1989, Mrs. Rudman filed a Notice of Appeal. Record at 
399-400. On August 14, 1989, Mr. Rudman filed a Notice of Cross 
Appeal. Record at 406-7. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Rudman and Mr. Rudman were married on April 18, 1981, in 
Sun Valley, Idaho. The marriage followed ten years of acquaintance 
including five years of dating. Vol. IV, p. 45-6. The Decree of 
Divorce was entered on July 3, 1989, after over eight years of 
marriage. Record at 392-6. 
4A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached as Exhibit B. 
5A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce are attached as Exhibits C and D, respectively. 
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Both parties had previously been married and divorced. Vol. 
II, p. 14 and Vol. IV, p. 46. At the time of her marriage to Mr. 
Rudman, Mrs. Rudman was receiving $1,100.00 per month in alimony 
from her former husband. Vol. IV, p. 46. 
Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had numerous conversations 
with Mr. Rudman about her concerns that her alimony would terminate 
upon remarriage, and about her inability to adequately support 
herself if this marriage should fail. Not trusting her own 
judgment, Mrs. Rudman sought legal counsel. Vol. IV, p. 47-51. 
After consultation with legal counsel, a prenuptial agreement 
was prepared by Mrs. Rudman's counsel and entered into by the 
parties on April 15, 1981. Vol. IV, p. 51-2 and Exhibit 41. Mrs. 
Rudman's motivation for entering into the prenuptial agreement was 
to forestall any difficulty with Mr. Rudman's children attempting 
to disrupt the marriage. Vol. IV, p. 52. The prenuptial agreement 
did not describe or define the premarital property of either party 
other than a condominium owned by Mr. Rudman. Exhibit 41. 
Upon Mrs. Rudman's marriage to Mr. Rudman, alimony payments 
from her former spouse terminated. Vol. IV, p. 54. At the time 
of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had just received her insurance 
license and was preparing to pursue a career in insurance sales. 
Mr. Rudman objected to Mrs. Rudman pursuing her new career due to 
the fact that she would be away from the home in the evening and 
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she was assigned to a male trainer. Mr. Rudman requested that Mrs. 
Rudman immediately terminate that career, which she did. Vol. IV, 
p. 55. 
Mrs. Rudman has a high school education and one year of 
training as a nurse. She has obtained no degree or license other 
than the insurance license. During her first marriage, Mrs. Rudman 
worked as a babysitter, a telephone operator, a specialty 
advertising salesperson and performed other general office work, 
all at minimum wage. Vol. IV, p. 55-58. 
Subsequent to her first divorce, Mrs. Rudman established and 
operated a telephone answering service. The business was sold in 
1976 for $80,000.00. Vol. IV, p. 58. From the time the business 
was sold until her marriage to Mr. Rudman in 1981, Mrs. Rudman 
supported herself from interest and dividend earnings on income-
producing assets that had been acquired as the result of her sale 
of the business and her prior home. Vol. IV, p. 59. Mrs. Rudman 
also operated a diet center and a housecleaning business during the 
course of the marriage. Vol. IV, p. 59-60. Neither business 
generated more than nominal income. Vol. V, p. 14-21 and Exhibits 
97-101. 
During the course of the marriage, Mr. Rudman did not give 
Mrs. Rudman any money for the operation of the household or for her 
own use and personal expenses. Vol. IV, p. 60-1. As the level of 
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interest income earned from her investments declined, due to the 
falling interest rates experienced in the mid-1980's as compared 
to the late 1970's and early 1980', Mrs. Rudman was forced to use 
her cash assets and attempt to secure other employment to support 
herself. Vol. IV, p. 59-64. 
At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had in excess of 
$195,000.00 in liquid income-producing assets. Vol. V, p. 6-8 and 
Exhibit 94. She also had $17,000.00 of equity in an automobile. 
Id. At the time of divorce, Mrs. Rudman had $8,820.16 in liquid 
income-producing assets and a residence in Logan, Utah, with 
equity, as found by the trial court, of approximately $67,500.00. 
Id. and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 20.e. 
Record at 384. 
Prior to and during the marriage, Mr. Rudman operated theater 
businesses in five states with over twenty screens. The business 
was conducted through several entities including Westates, Cache 
Amusement, T.T.&S. Corporation, and other business entities. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 16. Record at 
381-3. 
During the marriage, Mrs. Rudman substantially assisted Mr. 
Rudman in the operation of his theater business. Mrs. Rudman 
helped remodel, clean, vacuum, paint, run errands, make and hang 
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drapes and purchase and prepare food. Mrs. Rudman also worked as 
a ticket taker. Vol. V, p. 27-30. 
During the marriage, Mrs. Rudman also assisted in the 
construction and furnishing of a cabin at Scofield, Utah and other 
properties owned by Mr. Rudman. Mrs. Rudman used in excess of 
$1,500.00 of her personal funds in furnishing the cabin. Vol. V, 
p. 60-62. 
Mrs. Rudman suffers from back pain and numbness of her right 
leg and hypersensitivity in the right foot as the result of being 
thrown from a horse. She also suffers from intermittent growths 
in her thyroid and from stress. Vol. V, p. 1-5. 
The parties had no children born as issue of their marriage. 
Vol. I, p. 24. At the time of trial, Mrs. Rudman was 60 years of 
age and Mr. Rudman was 63 years of age. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 3. Record at 378. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First, prior to her marriage to Mr. Rudman, Mrs. Rudman was 
receiving $1,100.00 per month of permanent alimony and had in 
excess of $195,000.00 in income-producing assets to support 
herself. The trial court awarded Mrs. Rudman $1,100.00 per month 
of alimony to her age 65 and approximately $32,000.00 of cash 
assets. Given Mrs. Rudman's reasonable monthly needs of $2,853.00, 
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the trial court's temporary alimony award of $1,100.00 constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. 
Second, the trial court erred in its characterization of 
certain property as non-marital in nature. The trial court also 
erred in the value ascribed to certain marital property in light 
of the evidence before it. Accordingly, the trial court abused its 
discretion in its award of property to Mrs. Rudman. 
Finally, Mrs. Rudman incurred attorney's and expert witness 
fees in excess of $55,500.00. Each party was ordered to pay their 
own fees and costs. Mrs. Rudman does not have the financial 
ability to pay her fees and costs. The failure of the trial court 
to award any fees and costs is inequitable and constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF ALIMONY AWARDED 
The trial court found that prior to the marriage of the 
parties, Mrs. Rudman was receiving $1,100.00 per month as permanent 
alimony from a former spouse. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, paragraph 13. Record at 380. The trial court also found that 
Mrs. Rudman 
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was fearful of losing this alimony by 
remarriage and expressed her concern to the 
Plaintiff and the necessity that this marriage 
be permanent. The Court finds that the 
Defendant lost this alimony by virtue of her 
marriage to the Plaintiff and that it is 
reasonable and just that temporary alimony be 
paid to her until she reaches the age of Social 
Security retirement, age 65. (Emphasis added) . 
Id. In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated that this 
award of alimony 
. . . is intended to return the Defendant to 
the position she was in prior to the marriage 
to the Plaintiff. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 4. Record at 
387. The $1,100.00 per month award of alimony by the trial court 
did restore Mrs. Rudman to the amount of alimony she was receiving 
prior to the marriage of the parties but not to the duration of 
that alimony. In addition, Mrs. Rudman was, prior to the marriage 
of the parties, supplementing her alimony with income from a 
substantial base of income-producing assets. During the marriage, 
this base of income-producing assets was dissipated because Mrs. 
Rudman was forced to support herself without assistance from Mr. 
Rudman. Under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its 
discretion by not making a permanent alimony award to Mrs. Rudman 
for the amount of her reasonable needs. 
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A. The Amount Of Alimony. 
In Munns v. Munns, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
the Utah Court of Appeals has most recently reiterated the standard 
for an award of alimony. 
In setting an award of alimony, a trial court 
must consider three factors: 1) the financial 
condition and need of the receiving spouse; 2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce 
a sufficient income for him or herself; and 3) 
the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
support. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 90. Nowhere in the trial court's Memorandum Decision or 
its Findings of Fact is there any indication that it considered or 
analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of these three 
factors. The only finding and conclusion dealing with the issue 
of alimony is that cited above. 
A trial court's award of such support in a 
divorce proceeding will not be set aside absent 
a showing of abuse of discretion. However, the 
trial court must make findings on all material 
issues, and such findings must be sufficiently 
detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts 
to reveal the steps the court took to reach its 
conclusion on each factual issue presented. 
Failure to substantiate such findings 
constitutes reversible error unless the facts 
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment." (Citations omitted.) 
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.26 615, 617 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The trial court failed to adequately make findings and 
conclusions sufficient for this court to determine whether the 
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trial court properly analyzed the circumstances of the parties in 
light of these three factors. Notwithstanding that failure, 
finding of fact no. 13 does allow the following implications to be 
drawn: 
1. Mrs. Rudman does have financial needs. Otherwise, no 
alimony would have been awarded. 
2. Mrs. Rudman does not have the ability to totally satisfy 
her own financial needs. Otherwise, Mr. Rudman would not have been 
ordered to pay alimony. 
3. Mr. Rudman has the financial ability to provide for the 
financial needs and support of Mrs. Rudman. Otherwise, Mr. Rudman 
would not have been ordered to pay alimony. 
Although these three additional findings are implicit in 
finding of fact no. 13, there is no basis in fact or law for the 
trial court to have awarded temporary alimony in the amount of 
$1,100.00 per month. This Court's analysis, by a review of the 
record and the evidence, will compel it to conclude that the trial 
court abused its discretion in fixing the alimony award at 
$1,100.00 per month. 
First, Exhibit 102 evidences the monthly financial needs of 
Mrs. Rudman in the amount of $2,853.00. Her need is modest given 
the lifestyle the parties enjoyed during the marriage. Mrs. 
Rudman's testimony as to the reasonableness of these needs stands 
2102036.PL2 13 
unrebutted. Vol. V, p. 59. It is unknown upon what evidence the 
trial court relied and baffling how it concluded that Mrs. Rudman 
has financial needs of only $1,100.00 per month. 
Second, Mrs. Rudman has shown limited ability to produce an 
income sufficient to provide for her own needs. She made 
continuous efforts throughout the marriage to provide for the 
parties' needs through self-employed business ventures but little, 
if any, income was generated therefrom. Mrs. Rudman has not earned 
more than $6,000.00 per year from any of her business ventures. 
Exhibit 101. Mrs. Rudman was forced to pursue these business 
ventures due to Mr. Rudman's refusal to provide any assistance to 
her in satisfying the financial needs of the parties during the 
marriage. The result was the dissipation of practically all of her 
pre-marital income-producing assets. 
Finally, Mr. Rudman has the ability to provide the financial 
support Mrs. Rudman requires. Exhibit 118 evidences that Mr. 
Rudman had cash income before taxes for the years 1982 through 1988 
of at least $64,791 and as high as $141,876 per year. Given Mr. 
Rudman's income, he should not be allowed to withhold his financial 
support after the marriage as he did during the marriage. This is 
particularly true in light of the fact that the income-producing 
assets of Mrs. Rudman have now been dissipated. Equity requires 
that Mr. Rudman support his former spouse. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Rudman should be ordered to pay alimony in 
the amount of $2,853.00 per month less any amount this court finds 
that Mrs. Rudman may be able to generate from her employment. 
B. The Duration of Alimony 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have held 
on numerous occasions that temporary alimony is inappropriate for 
women in circumstances comparable to those of Mrs. Rudman. Factors 
which have been considered include: (1) age; (2) education; (3) 
professional and vocational training and skills; (4) prior work 
experience; (5) anticipated income from future employment; (6) 
independent income; (7) health; and (8) the length of the 
marriage.6 
In this case, Mrs. Rudman was 60 years old at the time of 
trial. The divorce occurred after an eight year marriage and five 
years of steady dating prior thereto. Mrs. Rudman suffers from 
back and other health problems. She has no education beyond high 
school and no professional or vocational training or skills. 
Although she has been self-employed in the past, her most recent 
attempts have produced only nominal income and such levels of 
income can only be anticipated in the future. 
6
 Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Paffel v. Paffel, 
732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
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Mrs. Rudman had income-producing assets valued in excess of 
$195,000.00 prior to the marriage but was only awarded $32,000.00 
of cash by the trial court. She used substantially all of her 
income-producing assets to support herself and Mr. Rudman during 
the marriage either directly or indirectly by her attempts to earn 
income through business ventures. In addition to the $32,000.00, 
Mrs. Rudman was awarded a home in Logan with an equity of 
$67,500.00, as found by the trial court, and the Merry Maid 
business. Mr. Rudman, on the other hand, has income-producing 
assets valued in excess of $4,000,000.00 according to his only 
financial statements (Exhibit 78) and has consistently earned in 
excess of $100,000.00 per year. Exhibit 118. 
The trial court attempts to establish in its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law that it is restoring Mrs. Rudman to the 
position she enjoyed prior to the marriage. To do so, however, 
Mrs. Rudman must receive permanent alimony in the amount of 
$1,100.00 per month and $190,000.00 of income-producing assets. 
The trial court's award of temporary alimony in conjunction with 
its meager property award to Mrs. Rudman falls far short of its 
stated goal. 
Mrs. Rudman is unable to provide for all of her financial 
needs. Exhibits 101 and 102. It is unrealistic to assume that 
Mrs. Rudman will be able to provide for herself beyond age 65. It 
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is equitable that Mrs. Rudman be awarded permanent alimony in the 
amount of $2,853.00 per month to terminate on the occurrence of 
events provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (1989). The 
award of temporary alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month 
constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion and should, 
therefore, be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
CHARACTERIZATION AND DETERMINATION OF 
THE VALUE OF CERTAIN MARITAL PROPERTY 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1989) tersely provides: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to 
the children, property, and parties. . . 
The term "property" is not defined in the Code. In structuring a 
property division, the trial court should attempt to 
. . . allocate the property in a manner which 
best serves the needs of the parties and best 
permits them to pursue their separate lives. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, the trial court erred in (1) its character-
ization of certain property as separate or non-marital in nature 
and (2) its determination of the value of certain items of marital 
property. 
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A. The Characterization Of Property 
The trial court found that the parties voluntarily entered 
into a prenuptial agreement and that it was unambiguous and could 
be interpreted as a matter of law. The trial court also found that 
each party relinquished all rights to any property accumulated by 
the other party prior to the marriage but that any property 
accumulated by the parties "either individually or jointly" 
following the marriage would be marital property. The trial court 
further found any premarital property would remain the property of 
the party owning it prior to the marriage including any interest 
or increase in the value of that property after the marriage. 
Property acquired after the marriage would be considered marital 
property "less that amount utilized for its acquisition where that 
amount could be traced as premarital property." (Emphasis added). 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 6-10. Record 
at 378-80. See, also Exhibit E. 
The trial court found ten items of real and personal property 
to constitute marital property. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, paragraphs 19 and 20. Record at 383-4. The trial court, 
however, improperly excluded as marital property, other assets 
acquired during the marriage. 
The first category of marital property improperly excluded by 
the trial court was loans Mr. and Mrs. Rudman made during the 
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marriage to various business entities which operate Mr. Rudman's 
theaters. Mrs. Rudman's expert witness, Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
testified that the total net increase in the amount of such loans 
during the marriage was $269,704.00. Vol. V, p. 166-8 and 191-6 
and Exhibit 117. That amount represents the net increase during 
the marriage in the amount of funds payable by Mr. Rudman's 
business entities to the Rudmans individually. 
Due to the lack of information and documents produced by Mr. 
Rudman, Mr. Norman was unable to specifically identify or trace the 
source of the loaned funds. When questioned by Mr. Rudman's 
counsel, Mr. Norman testified: 
Q. Can you tell me if they [the loans receivable] 
were assets in existence prior to the marriage 
or after the marriage that those funds came 
from? 
A. The information traceable is not available. 
Q. It could be either not available or your people 
didn't find it or look for it; is that 
accurate? 
A. No, it could be as Mr. Rudman expressed that 
he didn't know who it was owed to, or when it 
started and I think the same would be true of 
me. I can tie it down to an asset that is 
created during the marriage because it doesn't 
exist before the marriage. But I can't fill 
in all the missing blanks for you. I don't 
believe you can either. 
Vol. V, p. 192-3. Mr. Rudman presented no evidence as to the 
source of the loaned funds. 
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The issue then becomes whether the source of the money loaned 
by the Rudmans to the business entities constituted non-marital or 
marital property. If non-marital, the source of the funds must be 
traced to pre-marital assets or earnings from pre-marital assets. 
Otherwise, pursuant to the prenuptial agreement, the source of the 
funds must be considered marital in nature. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
As a general rule, pre-marital property, gifts, 
and inheritances may be viewed as the separate 
property of the parties. Burke v. Burke. 733 
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
However, 
[t]he rule that property acquired by gift or 
inheritance by one spouse should be awarded to 
that spouse on divorce unless the other spouse 
has, by his or her efforts with regard to the 
property, acquired an equity in it does not 
apply when the property thus acquired is 
consumed, such as . . . when the property 
completely loses its identity and is not 
traceable because it is commingled with other 
property (sometimes called transmuted), Wierman 
v. Wierman, supra: Klinabera v. Klingbera. 
supra. Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1979). . . (Emphasis added.) 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988). 
Thus, as Mr. Norman testified, during the course of the 
marriage, there was a $269,704.00 increase in loans receivable held 
by the Rudmans payable from the various business entities. No 
evidence was presented to allow the trial court to trace the source 
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of the loaned funds. Accordingly, the $269,704.00 in loans 
receivable held by the Rudmans at the termination of the marriage 
should be characterized as marital property. 
The second category of marital property improperly excluded 
by the trial court was (1) improvements to the Bloomington 
condominium, (2) improvements to and furnishing of the Scofield 
cabin and (3) improvements to and furnishing of the Elizabeth 
Street condominium. Mrs. Rudman presented testimony that 
approximately $1,300.00, $17,000.00 and $8,598.00, respectively, 
of improvements and furnishings were expended in conjunction with 
these assets. Exhibit 117. 
Mrs. Rudman testified that the majority of the furniture she 
brought into the marriage was used in the Elizabeth Street 
condominium and the Scofield cabin. Vol. V, p. 23-25. Her 
furniture from the Scofield cabin has not been returned. Id. The 
Scofield cabin was improved and furnished during the marriage. 
Vol. V, p. 60-1. The best evidence as to the amount of the 
improvements to the Scofield cabin is the testimony of the Rudman's 
insurance agent who testified that the insurance coverage was 
increased by Mr. Rudman from 1981 to 1982 in the amount of 
$17,000.00. Vol II, p. 163-4. 
Accordingly, the trial court should have characterized the 
improvement to and furnishing of the above-described properties as 
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marital property and included in the marital estate the amount of 
$26,898.00. 
B. The Value Of Excluded Marital Assets 
The trial court erred in its determination of the values found 
for certain of the marital assets. 
1. Loans Receivable. As previously stated, the loans 
receivable by the Rudmans from the various business entities in the 
amount of $269,704.00 should be included in the marital estate. 
2. Improvement and Furnishing Expenses. As previously 
stated, improvement costs and furnishing expenses in the amount of 
$26,898.00, should be included in the marital estate. 
3. Cinemas I, II & III in St. George. The trial court found 
that the value of the Rudman's one-half interest in the property 
commonly referred to as Cinemas I, II, & III in St. George was 
$19,000. These three theaters were operated in the Westates entity. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 20.a. Record 
at 384. 
Mr. Rudman's expert witness, Stephen Nicolatus, testified that 
these cinemas had a total value of $76,000.00 using an income 
approach to value and a $0.00 value using the asset approach to 
value. Exhibit 59, p. 19 and 21, respectively. Vol IV, p. 6-37. 
Mr. Nicolatus used a 25 percent capitalization rate in his 
computation of the income approach. Mr. Nicolatus also charged 42 
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percent of the compensation paid for management of all 24 of the 
theaters in Westates to the three theaters which were being valued. 
Mr. Norman testified, without rebuttal, that use of the 
capitalization rate of 25 percent was too high based on independent 
industry-wide statistics. Vol. V, p. 140-1. Mr. Norman testified 
that a capitalization rate of 18 percent should be used. In 
reviewing theater industry statistics for six years, Mr. Norman 
concluded that the return on equity never exceeded 18 percent and 
that a rate of approximately 10 percent was more realistic. 
Mr. Norman also testified that the management compensation 
assigned to these three theaters was excessive and that an 
adjustment to the calculated net income was necessary. Mr. Norman 
allowed 25 percent of the management compensation to be charged to 
these three theaters. Although the trial court is vested with 
broad discretion to interpret the evidence, common sense requires 
the conclusion that Mr. Nicolatus' management compensation 
allocation and capitalization rate were improper. Applying these 
two changes in the income approach to value, Mr. Norman calculated 
the value of the cinemas to be $172,072.00. Exhibit 117. 
The trial court found Mr. Rudman's one-half interest in these 
cinemas to be $19,000.00. Findings of Fact, paragraph 20.a. 
Record at 384. Although the Findings of Fact are not clear, the 
trial court apparently averaged Mr. Nicolatus' income approach to 
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value ($38,000.00 for Mr. Rudman's one-half interest) and his asset 
approach to value ($0.00 for Mr. Rudman's one-half interest) to 
determine a value of $19,000.00. Id. However, even Mr. Nicolatus 
did not average the approaches. This court should adopt the 
methodology and assumptions employed by Mr. Norman and increase the 
value of the marital estate by $67,000, representing the difference 
between Mr. Norman's appraisal of $86,000 and the trial court's 
determination of $19,000 for Mr. Rudman's one-half interest in the 
three theaters. 
4. The Jeep Wagoneer. Mr. Rudman presented no evidence to 
support his claim that the value of his 1988 Jeep Wagoneer was 
$12,000.00 as of the date of the trial, as illustrated in Exhibit 
40. Mr. Norman used a NADA blue book to determine the value of the 
Jeep at $17,813.00 as of April, 1989. Exhibit 177, note N. 
Although an owner of property can testify as to its value, the 
trial court adopted Mr. Rudman's assertion as to value while 
totally ignoring the NADA blue book, the best and most credible 
evidence. 
Accordingly, the value of the marital estate should be 
increased by $5,813.00 representing the difference in the two 
values ascribed to the Jeep. 
5. Cinemas II and III— Cache Amusement in Logan, Utah. The 
trial court found that Cinemas II and III of Cache Amusement 
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located in Logan, Utah, had a marital value of a negative 
$5,348.00. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 
20.d. Record at 384. The trial court adopted Mr. Rudman's 
analysis and computation of value as presented in Exhibit 40. Mr. 
Rudman's analysis of value consisted of three elements: (1) the 
appraised value of the real property in the amount of $415,000.00 
(Exhibit 31), plus (2) the equipment value of $1,243.00, less (3) 
the cost of construction in the amount of $426,939.00, equaling a 
total value of a negative of $10,696.00. Mr. Rudman's 50 percent 
ownership in the two theaters is, therefore, valued at a negative 
$5,340.00. 
Mr. Norman employed the same methodology as Mr. Rudman to 
value the theaters except in two respects. First, Mr. Norman 
included the equipment at a value that is more representative of 
its market value. Mr. Rudman used a value of $1,243.00 based on 
an "aggressive" depreciation method for tax purposes. Vol. V, p. 
144-7 and Exhibit 116. Mr. Rudman's approach assumed that the 
equipment depreciated from its cost of $106,096.00 as to January, 
1985, to a value of $1,243.00 as of April, 1989. Such an 
assumption and approach does not reflect the true value of the 
equipment as of the date of valuation. 
Second, Mr. Norman subtracted the debt of Cache Amusement 
associated with the construction costs in the amount of $339,459.00 
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rather than the actual cost of construction in the amount of 
$426,939.00, as Mr. Rudman did. Exhibit 116. This difference in 
methodology again raises the issue of whether the source of the 
money used to pay down the debt constitutes non-marital or marital 
property. If non-marital, the source of the funds must be traced 
to pre-marital assets or earnings on pre-marital assets. 
Otherwise, pursuant to the prenuptial agreement, the funds 
constitute marital property. In Schedule B5 of Exhibit 42, Mr. 
Rudman attempts to establish that all funds for the construction 
of the cinemas came from pre-marital assets or earnings thereon. 
Due to the substantial commingling that is present, tracing the 
funds is impossible. The source of the funds must, therefore, be 
considered marital property. 
The value of the marital estate should, therefore, be 
increased by $103,174.00 representing the difference between the 
value of $97,826.00 as determined by Mr. Norman and $<5,348.00> as 
determined by Mr. Rudman for the Logan cinemas. 
In summary, the value of the marital estate should, therefore, 
be increased as follows: 
Loans Receivable $269,704 
Improvement/Furnishings $ 26,898 
St. George Cinemas $ 67,000 
Jeep Wagoneer $ 5,813 
Logan Cinemas $103,174 
$472,589 
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As a test of reasonableness as to the amount the marital 
estate increased in value during the marriage, this Court need only 
review Exhibits 73-78. Those Exhibits, personal financial 
statements prepared by Mr. Rudman, demonstrate an increase in value 
in excess of $2 million during the marriage. The trial court's 
determination that the marital estate consisted of property valued 
at $63,134.00 and that Mrs. Rudman should receive a cash award of 
one-half of that amount constitutes a clear abuse of the trial 
court's discretion under the facts of this case. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BT FAILING TO AWARD MRS. RUDMAN HER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
In this case, the trial court expressed concern about the 
amount of attorney's fees and expert witness fees incurred by the 
parties. Mrs. Rudman's attorney's fees were in excess of 
$38,000.00, voluntarily reduced to $28,000.00 by her trial counsel, 
and expert witness fees exceeded $27,500.00. Mr. Rudman's 
attorney's fees exceeded $15,800.00 and his expert witness fees 
were "somewhat less than that." Findings of Fact and Conclusion 
of Law, paragraph 24. Record at 386. The trial court ordered each 
party to assume and pay their own attorney's and expert witness 
fees. Decree of Divorce, paragraph 12. Record at 390. Although 
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the attorney for each party presented evidence to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of their respective fees, the trial court found "no 
need . . . to rule upon the reasonableness of the fees and costs 
in this matter." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
paragraph 25. Record at 386. 
To recover attorney fees and costs in a divorce action, 
the moving party must show evidence (1) 
establishing the financial need of the 
requesting party, and (2) demonstrating the 
reasonableness of the amount of the award. 
(Citations omitted). 
Munns v. Munns, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 88, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, Mrs. Rudman incurred attorney's and expert 
witness fees of $55,500.00. Mrs. Rudman had $6,000.00 of cash at 
the time of trial and was awarded an additional $26,305.50 under 
the Decree of Divorce to equalize the division of the marital 
estate. Decree of Divorce, paragraphs 4 and 5. Record at 394-5. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Rudman was awarded $32,305.50 of liquid assets 
which will not even begin to approach the amount necessary to pay 
her fees and costs. Mrs. Rudman's financial need is, therefore, 
clearly established. In fact, an attempt by Mrs. Rudman to pay the 
fees will place her in financial jeopardy. 
The evidence also clearly establishes that Mr. Rudman has the 
ability to pay for Mrs. Rudman's fees. Mr. Rudman was awarded 
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assets with a value in excess of $4 million, which assets generate 
substantial cash flow to him. 
The record reflects that counsel for Mrs. Rudman had to take 
extraordinary measures including numerous motions and hearings to 
pursue discovery and force Mr. Rudman to pay ordered support. Vol. 
V, p. 214-121 and Exhibit 120. The trial court's failure to award 
attorney's fees to Mrs. Rudman is particularly inequitable given 
the extraordinary measures her counsel was forced to take during 
the pendency of this action. 
The trial court's failure to award Mrs. Rudman her attorney's 
and expert witness fees is inequitable and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Similarly, the trial court's failure to rule on the 
reasonableness of the fees constitutes reversible error. 
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and 
the case remanded for determination of a reasonable award to Mrs. 
Rudman for her attorney's and expert witness fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to properly consider the evidence and 
the law in awarding $1,100.00 of temporary alimony. The trial 
court erred in its characterization of certain property as non-
marital and in its determination of value ascribed to certain 
marital property. The trial court further erred by failing to 
properly consider the evidence and the law and concluding that an 
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award of attorney's and expert witness fees to Mrs. Rudman was not 
appropriate. 
Therefore, this court should: 
1. Reverse the trial court's award of alimony and award 
permanent alimony in the amount of $2,853.00. 
2. Reverse the trial court's award of property and award Mrs. 
Rudman an additional amount of $236,295.00 to equalize the 
distribution of the marital estate. 
3. Reverse the trial court's failure to award attorney's and 
expert witness fees and award Mrs. Rudman the amount of $55,500.00 
for her fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of May, 1990. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Clark W. Sessions 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Attorneys for Evelyn W. Rudman 
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A D D E N D U M 
EXHIBIT A 
EXHIBIT A 
DETERMINAT i V"E AUTHORITY 
1. Utah Code Ann- § "iO-»J-5|I) (1989), 
(] ) When a decree of divorce Is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and 
parties. 
EXHIBIT B 
Thuoju.^uL:^ict 
EXHIBIT B APR 2 8 1989 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT •*? THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMI i WU SnLJ1 - .- : J . . - . , Li 1A1 b OF UTAH 
ANTHONY W. RUDMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EVELYN W RUDMAN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-87-1691 
days D£ trial. The parties submitted closing arguments by way of 
Memoranda. The Court has now reviewed the evidence, the argument 
of counsel , and makes the following decisi on. 
This Memorandum Decision is not a substitute for Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The prevai] i ng pan t;y wi ] 1 prepare 
Findings and Conclusions consistent with this decision, and 
include all facts deemed necessary to support the Court's 
decision. 
This was a marriage of relatively short duration. 
Plaintiff, Anthony Rudman, age 63, and defendant, Evelyn w. 
Rudman. age 60, M ex: e marrj ed < n Api i 1 I ', l'*fl I „ Mini '-;eparated si x 
years later on Apri 1 26, 2 98 7. 
Both parties had substantial assets prior to the marriage. 
Mr s R u d in a :i" i ]" e t a 1 n e d a rl a t f „ u r n e ) " 1: t > p r e pa r e a p r e n u p t i a 1 
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agreement. Both parties stipulated that the said agreement was 
entered into voluntarily, and without duress or fraud. Both 
parties assert that the said agreement is clear and unambiguous, 
and that the Court may interpret the same as a matter of law. 
The Court ruled that pursuant to the said agreement each party 
relinquished any and all rights to any property accumulated by 
the other party prior to the marriage, that such premarital 
property would not be deemed to be a marital asset of the parties 
following the marriage, and that any property accumulated by the 
parties "either individually or jointly" following the marriage 
would be marital property. The Court further ruled that any 
premarital property remain the property of the individual party, 
and that this would include any interest or increase in the value 
of that property after the marriage. The Court further ruled 
that that property acquired after the marriage would be marital 
property "less that amount" utilized for its acquisition where 
that amount could be traced to premarital property. 
Generally, property brought into the marriage by one spouse, 
or property acquired by gift and inheritance during the marriage 
by one spouse, or property acquired in exchange thereof, should 
go to that spouse unless the other spouse by his or her efforts 
or expense contributed substantially to the enhancement of that 
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p r o p e r t y t h e r e i in rinqui ri tiq an equ itabl e interest in 1.1" , or , w h e r e 
the property has lost its identity through commingling, or where 
the said spouse has made a gift of an interest in the property to 
the othei spouse, Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 F 2d 304 (Utah 
1988). 
In the case at bar however, the premarital agreement sets 
forth the proper t/y ri ght s :)f the pa r t i e s ai id, therefore, 
identifies as marital property that property accumulated during 
the marriage with either personal or marital funds, less that 
amoui it each spouse expended > acquire the said property. 
Both parties called expert witnesses (certified public 
accountants) . More often than, not exper t xi tnesses :j:ii ve 
testimony substantially different from each other, A national 
financial publication recently submitted a tax question to 50 
CPA 1 s acr o s s I: "he lini ted S t a t e s •in i received i d i f f e r e n t 
results - differences I n some instances exceeding 60%. 
Experts can differ theory and application. The same experts 
. - . * :. : -• ent 
conclusions common experience ; ^  - +> "rial courts. 
The case at bar is no exception. 
eterminar , ?:^ ,rt- wi"n no+" turn on 
the intricacies theory application where nearly anything 
can *r * ' *• * > - of thi s Court to 
do 1 a: which * . equitable. ' - *ilL look to the 
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expert testimony along with all other evidence and make its 
decision unto that end. 
Based upon the evidence, the Court finds as follows: 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter. 
The plaintiff is entitled to and is granted divorce from the 
defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
The defendant is entitled to and granted a divorce from the 
plaintiff on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman was receiving 
$1,100.00 per month alimony from a prior marriage. She was 
fearful of losing this alimony by remarriage and expressed her 
concerns to Mr. Rudman and the necessity of this remarriage being 
permanent. She lost this alimony by virtue of her marriage to 
Mr. Rudman. It is reasonable and just that Mrs. Rudman be 
awarded temporary alimony of $1,100.00 per month, until she 
reaches the age of social security retirement, age 65. 
The parties both contributed to living expenses during the 
marriage, with Mrs. Rudman paying for food and miscellaneous 
household expenses from her own funds and Mr. Rudman paying for 
the housing, taxes and certain household expenses from his funds. 
These parties seemed content to share in such expenses from their 
own funds and while it would appear Mr. Rudman paid a greater 
share of such expenses, there is no real evidence to determine 
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this tiwi t ho court finds I (hit neillit'i pari1,1 qained an id vint
 (a^p 
over the other In this regard. 
Mr Rudman had considerable properties at the ti me of his 
man: iage I o Mrs h'uclmari , "iriit?i:e has been no commingli ng of Mr. 
Rudman 1s assets with those of Mrs, Rudman Mr. Rudman1s assets 
have maintained their separate identity, even where there has 
beei 1 expai isi 0:1: 1, :i : emode] :ii i l g :: i: improvemer 1 t in i: egar ds to 1 i i s 
premarital property. Mrs. Rudman did not contribute labor or 
assets towards any of these properties. I* reasonable and 
just that Mr Ri ldmai 1 have and mai nta in h is premarital proper ties, 
including the improvements and increase in values thereof. Such 
property includes the condominium on El Izabeth Street, the 
Scofield property, the theatre properties existincr »+• +-he time of 
the marriage, Westates Partnership, and includes proceeds from 
the , except where si ich pi: oceeds may ha^ ire been 
used accumulate new property which case the prenuptial 
agreement would apply to the equitable interest thereof. 
M r s RiidittiiiNi I i. 111 i ' o n s i d e n a b i e r - . e l s nt " l i e t i n i uf t h e 
marriage and from her assets established two different 
businesses, and bought •- ' :?• There has been no 
comm ; .*• assetb . those of Mr Rudman. 
And, Mr Rudman did not contribute labor or assets towards any of 
these properties. However, they were newly acquired during the 
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marriage and the equity therein is governed by the premarital 
agreement. 
This Court finds that the only newly acquired property to be 
considered marital property of this marriage are the St. George 
leasehold, the added screens to the Logan cinemas, the Davis 
land, the St. George lot, the Sumac Drive property in Logan, the 
Merry Maids business, the Diet Center which was sold during the 
marriage, and miscellaneous personal property. 
The Court finds that the marital property has the following 
values: 
1. Plaintiff fs one-half interest in the St. George 
leasehold has a value of $19,000.00. 
2. The St. George lot has an equitable value of 
$22,250.00. 
3. The Davis land has a value of $28,650.00, of which the 
plaintiff's one-half interest is $14,325.00. 
4. The Logan cinemas additions have a value of 
$416,243.00. The cost of construction was $426,939.00, leaving a 
negative balance of $10,696.00. Mr. Rudman1s one-half interest 
in this negative balance is -$5,348.00. 
5. The property on Sumac Drive in Logan has a value of 
$107,500.00. Mrs. Rudman made a down payment of $32,500.00, took 
a mortgage of $40,000.00, and spent $42,000.00 to remodel. There 
is a negative balance of $7,000.00. 
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6. The 0 i e t Cent s 7" was pnirchased by defendant for 
$38,000.00, and sold for $50,000.00 during the marriage. A 
considerable amount was spent by defendant m improving the said 
tins i ness . The i"Vm i i< f inds $;', 000 , 0 0 eqi * < -- ealized from the 
sale . r tr.e center. 
The Court finds that Merry Maids has an equitable value 
*~ v-iV;r if 1,500 shares of Technolab, Inc. is unknown 
to t ~e Court, v^.w each party should be entitled to one-half of 
the 
The Jeep Wagoneer is marital property and has an equity 
of $ ; . 
i: it I a 3 1? Inane i a 1 shares have a va lue o f 
$587 :; 
The Court makes the following award: 
The Court awards to Mr. Rudman the following property: 
PROPERTY VALUE 
St. George cinema interest $19,000,00 
Logan cinema interest - 5,343.00 
22,250,0 3 
Jeep Wagoneer 1,471,61 
Davis property 14
 f 3 25.00 
TOTAL $51,698.61 
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Mrs. Rudman is awarded the following: 
PROPERTY VALUE 
Logan home -$7,000.00 
Diet Center sale proceeds 2,000.00 
Merry Maids 3,500.00 
Prudential Financial shares 587.50 
TOTAL -$ 912.50 
Inasmuch as Mr. Rudman is awarded most of the property, with 
a value of $51,698.61 and Mrs. Rudman's property comes to a minus 
value of -$912.50, a cash settlement of $26,305.50 must be made 
to equalize the award. Mrs. Rudman is awarded that sum. 
In addition to the above, furniture and furnishings were 
purchased during the marriage. Mrs. Rudman has considerable 
amount of the said furniture in her possession. Mr. Rudman 
purchased replacement furniture during the period of separation. 
All is marital property. The Court finds that each party should 
keep that personal property presently in his or her own 
possession, and that they are approximately equal in value. 
In regards to attorney's fees and costs, each party is 
ordered to pay his and her own. While the Court awarded Mrs. 
Rudman alimony until she reaches the age of 65, it did so only 
because it found that she gave up alimony in marrying Mr. Rudman, 
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hhat t* hprf J' i"i i oncpiri nm 11 c? r part prim hi t he Tn.irriaqe, indl Mirj 
matter was discussed between them. However, this was a marriage 
of short duration. Prior to this marriage, Mrs. Rudman was 
e m p 1 o y e d a s «;i 11, i n s u r a ri c e a qi e n t a n 11 s u b s e q u e n t ] y • •  ^J € * - T ! '• y e d , 
owning an answering service which she sold in fi)r 
$80,000.00, During "Kc="r first marriage she was employed. During 
ti'ii s mart .. - s t n lp • t M o separate Ibus:i nesses. an i i s 
presently self-employed in a third business. She lives in Sal t 
Lake City, but has purchased a second home in Logan, Utah which 
she v isits pen iodical ly whenever she can She is a very pleasant 
and dignified appearing woman, and based upon her history there 
i s n o r e a s o n w h y s h e s h c u 3 c:i i I o t c o n t i n u e t o w o r k. She h a s t h e 
means to provide for reasonable attorney's fees and costs, 
The Court is very concerned about the fees arid costs 
excess of $3 8,000,o0 {voluntarily decreased to $2 8,000.00), and 
the fee f :>i:: her expert witness, CPA Merrill Norman, exceeds 
$ 2,'/ , ":> 0 0 00 Mr Rudmai l! s a t: tor i ley s I" ees e xceed $ 1 ":>, 8 u0 u i , d i Ki 
his expert witness is somewhat less than that. 
Since the Court has ordered each party to pay its own fees 
iii'il cost s, til ler e :i s i 10 need for th is Court to nil e • IDI I the 
reasonableness of the fees and costs.. Each party has the means 
a n d rn i ist f, i. si y i t" \ ' > w 11 f e e s a n i "i i;:: o s t s , 
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Plaintiff's attorney will prepare the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree, and submit the same to 
defendant's attorney for approval as to form before submitting to 
the Court for final si« 
Dated this /--7Vr" ""Viay of April, 1989. 
IARD H. RUSS01 
STRICT COURT JUDGE 
i \ 4 > 4 • - 1 ' 
RUDMAN V. RUDMAN PAGE ELEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
f o 11 owing, th i s olfi day u t A p r 11, n 8 • * i 
Paul H. Liapis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake Citv 
£ 
EXHIBIT C 
EXHIBIT C 
PAUL H. LIAPIS #1956 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
ilk® $*&*,*'&>> v^.v-vvi 
Third Judicial O^iiici 
JUL 3 1989 
SALT LA; :L: c^'^'ti ry 
By ^ ^ / ^ ; 4 ^ : ^ L . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D87-1691 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ANTHONY W. RUDMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EVELYN W. RUDMAN, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on April 4, 
5, 11, and 12, 1989 before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, one 
of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff, ANTHONY W. 
RUDMAN, appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Paul 
H. Liapis, and Defendant, EVELYN W. RUDMAN, appearing in person 
and by and through her attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and the 
parties and expert witnesses having been duly sworn and examined 
under oath, and documentary evidence having been marked and 
received by the Court, and more than three months having elapsed 
since the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's Counter-
claim herein, and the Court having requested and received written 
argument from each party and having inquired into the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being fully advised 
in the premises, and the Court having issued its Memorandum 
Decision on the 28th day of April, 1989, the Court does now make, 
adopt, and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were bona fide and actual 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three 
months immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint herein, 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married on April 17, 1981, in Sun Valley, State of 
Idaho, and were separated six years later on April 26, 1987• The 
Court finds this was a marriage of relatively short duration. 
3. The Court finds that Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, is 
age 63, and Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, is age 60. 
4. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, 
and none are expected. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant are 
each entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
6. The Court finds that both parties had substantial 
assets prior to the marriage and that Defendant had retained an 
attorney to prepare a prenuptial agreement, which was signed by 
the parties prior to their marriage. 
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7. The Court finds that both parties stipulated that said 
agreement was entered into voluntarily, and without duress or 
fraud, that the agreement was clear and unambiguous and that the 
Court could interpret the same as a matter of law. 
8. The Court has previously ruled that pursuant to the 
prenuptial agreement, each party relinquished any and all rights 
to any property accumulated by the other party prior to the 
marriage, that such premarital property would not be deemed a 
marital asset of the parties following the marriage, and that any 
property accumulated by the parties "either individually or 
jointly" following the marriage would be marital property. The 
Court further ruled that said agreement provided that any 
premarital property would remain the property of the individual party 
owning it prior to the marriage and that this would include any 
interest or increase in the value of that property after the 
marriage. 
9. The Court further ruled that said agreement provided 
that property acquired after the marriage would be marital 
property "less that amount utilized for its acquisition where 
that amount could be traced as premarital property". 
10. The Court finds in this particular case that the 
premarital agreement clearly set forth the property rights 
accumulated by the parties during the marriage to be that 
property accumulated during the marriage with either personal or 
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marital funds less those amounts that each spouse expended to 
acquire said property. Further, the Court finds that all other 
property not falling into this definition is premarital and 
should be returned to the party owning that property prior to 
this marriage. 
11. The Court finds that both parties called expert 
witnesses to testify as to values and income in this matter. 
12. It is the purpose of this Court to do that which is 
fair, just, and equitable, and the Court will look to the expert 
testimony, along with all other evidence, in making its findings 
in this matter. 
13. The Court finds that prior to this marriage, the 
Defendant was receiving $1,100.00 per month as alimony from a 
prior marriage. The Court finds that Plaintiff was fearful of 
losing this alimony by remarriage and expressed her concern to 
the Plaintiff and the necessity that this marriage be permanent. 
The Court finds that the Defendant lost this alimony by virtue of 
her marriage to the Plaintiff and that it is reasonable and just 
that temporary alimony be paid to her until she reaches the age 
of Social Security retirement, age 65. 
14. The Court finds that both parties contributed to living 
expenses during the marriage, with Defendant paying for food and 
miscellaneous household expenses from her funds, and Plaintiff 
paying for the housing, taxes, and certain household expenses 
from his funds. The Court finds that both parties seemed content 
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to share these expenses from their own funds, that it appeared 
Plaintiff paid a greater share of said expenses, but that the 
evidence was inconclusive, and the Court finds that neither party 
gained an advantage over the other in this regard. 
15. The Court finds that the Plaintiff owned considerable 
properties at the time of the marriage to Defendant and that 
there was no co-mingling of Mr. Rudman's assets of those of the 
Defendant. Plaintiff's assets were maintained as a separate 
entity, including those where expansion, remodeling, or 
improvements had been made to that premarital property. The 
Court finds that Defendant did not contribute labor or assets 
toward any of these properties and that it is reasonable and just 
that the Plaintiff have and maintain his properties, including 
improvements and increases in values thereof. 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff premarital properties 
are as follows: 
a. Condominium at 2560 Elizabeth Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, acquired May 2, 1980. 
b. Trailer park and 14 acres of land in Scofield, 
Utah, acquired by inheritance on April 14, 1976. 
c. 10.4 acres of land in Scofield, Utah, upon which 
the cabin is situated, acquired by inheritance April, 1976. 
d. The Douglas Street triplex and Bonus Office 
Building sale contract, which properties were initially acquired 
in 1974 and sold in 1979. 
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e. Plaintiff's one-half interest in the Westates 
partnership, commenced approximately 30 years ago, which includes 
rentals of movie screens and/or theaters in Soda Springs, Mt. 
Home, Rupert, Preston, Burley, Caldwell and Pocatello, Idaho; 
Elko and Ely, Nevada; movie screens in Davis- (Layton), known as 
CinemaCorp, acquired in 1970, Logan, known as Cache Amusement, 
Inc., including the Redwood, Capital and Cinema I theaters; 
Monticello, Mt. Pleasant, Roosevelt, Ephraim, 6 screens in St. 
George, including the Cinema's I, II and III; the Gaiety, the 
Dixie, and the Starlight; Jackson and Lyman, Wyoming, and West 
Yellowstone, Montana. 
f. The Plaintiff's one-half interest in the St. 
George condominium acquired with James Nicolodemus on November 
13, 1972. 
g. Plaintiff's 80% ownership in T.T.& S. Corporation, 
organized in 1980, which included the assets that came from the 
Rock Theater Company, including, Montpelier, Evanston, and 
Rawlins Theater screens, the latter of which was sold in 1982. 
h. Plaintiff's interest in the Trolley Theaters, 
Trolley North, Trolley Corners, and Trolco, acquired in the mid-
1960' s, and the sale proceeds from Plaintiff's Trolley Square 
interests negotiated in 1984, and paid in full in January, 1988. 
i. Plaintiff's ownership in a 1975 Dodge truck and 
camper, a Jeep Wagoneer, a 1974 Ford horse truck, his jewelry, 
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bank accounts, two horses, one a 17 year old mare and the second 
its foal. 
j. Plaintiff's premarital bank accounts, including, 
but not limited to, those associated with all of the business 
entities referred to above. 
17. The Court finds that the Defendant had considerable 
assets at the time of the marriage and from her assets established 
two different businesses and bought a home in Logan. The Court 
finds there has been no co-mingling of the Defendant's assets 
with those of the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff did not 
contribute labor or assets toward any of these properties. 
18. The Court finds that from the Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's premarital assets there were newly acquired assets 
during the marriage and that the equities therein are governed by 
the terms of the premarital agreement. 
19. The Court finds that the newly acquired property to be 
considered as marital property in this marriage are the lease 
interest in the St. George movie screens Cinema I, II, and III, 
the added screens to the Logan Cinemas designated as Cinema II 
and III, the triangle piece of land added to the Davis Drive-in's; 
the St. George Bloomington lot #17; the Defendant's home at 1515 
Sumac Dr., Logan, Utah; the Defendant's Merry Maid business; the 
proceeds Defendant received from the sale of her Diet Center 
business and miscellaneous property. 
7 
20. The Court finds that the marital property has the 
following values and/or encumbrances: 
a. Plaintiff's one-half 
leasehold interest in St. 
George Cinemas I, II and III $ 19,000.00 
b. St. George Bloomington Lot #17 $ 22,250.00 
c. Plaintiff's one-half interest 
in the triangle land for the 
Davis Drive-in $ 14,325.00 
d. Cinemas II and III (additions 
to existing Cinema I) valued at 
$416,243.00 with construction costs of 
$426,939.00 leaving a negative balance of 
-$10,696.00. Plaintiff has a one-
half interest therein $ -5,348.00 
e. 1515 Sumac Dr., Logan, Utah-
$107,500.00, Defendant's down 
payment of $32,500.00, mortgage 
$40,000.00, remodeling costs-
$42,000.00-leaving a negative 
balance $ -7,000.00 
f. Defendant's Diet Center, initial 
purchase-$38,000.00 and sold for 
$50,000.00, Defendant's investment 
of considerable amounts therein, with 
a net value of $ 2,000.00 
g. Defendant's Merry Maid business with 
equitable value $ 3,500.00 
h. 1500 shares Techno-Lab stock, 
value unknown $ 0.00 
i. Plaintiff's Jeep Wagoneer, value 
$12,000.00, less lien of $10,528.39 $ 1,471.61 
j. 50 shares of Prudential Financial 
Service stock $ 587.50 
TOTAL $ 63,134.11 
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21. The Court finds that to equalize a division of the 
marital assets referred to above, that Plaintiff should pay a 
cash settlement to Defendant. 
22. The Court finds that during the marriage, furniture and 
furnishings were purchased and that the Defendant has a consider-
able amount of said items in her possession. The Court finds 
that the Plaintiff has purchased replacement furniture during the 
period of separation, which constitutes marital property. The 
Court finds that each party should keep those items of property 
presently in their possession and determines the same to be of 
approximately equal value. 
23. The Court finds that the Defendant was employed as an 
insurance agent and subsequently was self-employed in owning an 
answering service, which she sold in 1976 for $80,000.00. The 
Court finds that during her first marriage, she was employed, and 
that during this marriage, she has operated two separate 
businesses and is presently self-employed in the third. The 
Court find that the Defendant resides in Salt Lake City, but has 
purchased a second home in Logan, which she visits periodically. 
The Court finds Defendant is a very pleasant and dignified-
appearing woman, and based upon her history, there is no reason 
why she should not continue to work. The Court finds she has the 
means to provide for her own reasonable attorney fees and costs 
in this matter. 
9 
24. The Court finds that each party has incurred attorney 
fees and costs in this matter. The Court is concerned about the 
fees and costs incurred in this matter, the Defendant's attorney 
fees totalling in excess of $38,000.00, voluntarily decreased to 
$28,000.00 by her counsel, and expert fees of CPA Merrill Norman, 
exceeding $27,500.00. The Plaintiff's attorney fees exceeded 
$15,800.00, and his expert fees are somewhat less than that. 
25. The Court finds there is no need for the Court to rule 
upon the reasonableness of the fees and costs in this matter. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other upon grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
2. As the Court has previously ordered, and pursuant to 
the premarital agreement, each party has relinquished any and all 
rights to any property accumulated by the other prior to the 
marriage, and such premarital property will not be deemed to be 
a marital asset of the parties following the marriage, including 
any increase of value or interest acquired by that property after 
the marriage. The Court further rules that any property accumu-
lated by the parties "either individually or jointly, following 
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the marriage, will be deemed marital property, and any portion of 
premarital funds used to acquire the marital property will be 
reimbursed at its original investment value, with any appreciated 
values to be divided between the parties as marital assets." 
3. The Court holds that the premarital agreement clearly 
sets forth the property rights of the parties and identifies as 
marital property that property accumulated during the marriage 
with either personal or marital funds, less that amount each 
spouse expended to acquire said property. The Court's decision 
is made in accordance with the premarital agreement, the expert 
testimony of the parties, and other evidence received by the 
Court in this matter. 
4. Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, is ordered to pay to 
Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, temporary alimony in the sum of 
$1,100.00 per month commencing with the month, June, 1989, and 
continuing on the 5th and 20th day of each month until the 
Defendant reaches the age of Social Securuity retirement, age 65, 
or dies. This is intended to return the Defendant to the 
position she was in prior to the marriage to the Plaintiff. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property those assets of premarital ownership he held prior to 
this marriage and the marital assets including, but not limited 
to: 
The condominium at 2560 Elizabeth Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah; the trailer park situated on 14 acres of land in Scofield 
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Utah; the 10.4 acres of Scofield land and the cabin situated 
thereon; the proceeds received from the sale of the Douglas 
Street triplex and Bonus Office Building sale; the Defendant's 
one-half interest in Westates Partnership, including the 
partnership's interest in the screens at Soda Springs, Mountain 
Home, Rupert, Preston, Burley, Caldwell, and Pocatello, Idaho; 
the Elko and Ely screens in Nevada; the Davis Drive-in, known as 
the Cinema Corp., and the triangle section of land acquired 
during the marriage; the Redwood Capitol and Cinema I screens in 
Logan, known as Cache Amusement, Inc., the Cinema II and Cinema 
III screens, also known as Cache Amusement, Inc.; the screens in 
Monticello, Mt. Pleasant, Roosevelt, and Ephraim, Utah; the nine 
(9) screens in St. George known as Movies I, II, and III; the 
Gaiety, the Dixie, and the Starlight and the Cinema's I, II and 
III; the screens in Jackson and Lymon, Wyoming; the West 
Yellowstone, Montana screen; the Plaintiff's one-half interest in 
the condominium at St. George, Utah; Plaintiff's 80% ownership in 
the corporation known as T.T.& S.; all proceeds and interest 
Plaintiff owns in Trolley Theatres, Trolley North, Trolley 
Corners, Trolco and the proceeds from the sale of Trolley Square; 
the St. George Bloomington Lot; the Jeep Wagoneer; the 1975 Dodge 
truck and camper; the 1974 Ford horse truck; Plaintiff's jewelry; 
Plaintiff's bank accounts; the two horses; all of the furniture, 
furnishings, fixtures, and appliances presently in the 
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Plaintiff's control wheresoever situate; and all of his 
premarital bank accounts associated with each of the business 
entities. 
6. Defendant should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the home at 1515 Sumac Drive, Logan, Utah; the proceeds 
received from the sale of the Diet Center business; the Merry 
Maids business; the 1500 shares of Techno-Lab, Inc. stock; the 50 
shares of Prudential Financial Services stock; all of the 
furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances presently in her 
possession and under her control; her bank accounts and her 
personal effects and belongings. 
7. The Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of 
$26,305.50 to equalize the division of the marital assets in this 
matter. 
8. Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, should assume and pay 
and hold the Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, harmless from all debts 
and obligations against all of the properties awarded the Plaintiff 
in this matter, including the I.R.S business debt secured against 
the Plaintiff's condominium, together with any and all debts and 
obligations he has incurred in his own name since the filing of 
the Complaint in this matter. 
9. Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, should assume and pay and 
hold the Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, harmless from all debts 
and obligations against all of the properties awarded the Defendant 
in this matter, together with any and all debts and obligations 
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she has incurred in her own name since the filing of the 
Complaint in this matter. 
10. Plaintiff and Defendant should each be awarded their 
own life insurance policies to do with as they choose. 
11. Plaintiff should cooperate in the transfer of the 
current health, accident and hospitalization coverage to the 
Defendant for her benefit under the Federal COBRA legislation. 
Defendant should assume and pay all monthly costs associated with 
that coverage for the three years provided by the federal law. 
12. The parties should each assume and pay their own 
attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
13. The parties are ordered to execute any and all 
documents necessary to carry fo3:;th the intent of this Order. 
DATED thj 
:ess  forth 
lis ^P' day of-Jw^T 1989. 
V BY THE COURT: 
k m& 
V
"LEONARD H. RU 
APPROVED AS TO FORM THIS DAY OF JUNE, 1989. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that 7 caused to be hand delivered 
this p^7 day of Jun< • . rid S. Dolowitz, 
Attorney for Defendant, 525 East : South, Fifth Floor, 
Salt Lake City UT 84147. 
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EXHIBIT D 
EXHIBIT 
Third JuuK.;, 
PAUL H. LIAPIS #1956 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & I LAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
U:J-..,H;'Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
M ? 
ANTHONY W. RUDMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EVELYN W. RUDMAN, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
7-s ej 
/ 00 /or* 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D87-1691 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on April 4, 
of *:*•-? Judges or trie 3LHAH-HIV n . d , :u , rlaintifi, ANTHONY -> 
RUDMAN, appearing IT person a^ d hy a d *-;r ^: - -*:- /rone;., : aul 
an: i and through her attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and the 
parties and expert witnesses having been duly sworn and examined 
uiidhM ijdl.li, Jin! i li n 'iiiuiMi Ld i y <' " i ilcin '( lliii1 J 11 < 1 I u .a t«n nuik • ! "nl 
received by the Court, and more than three months havinc elapsed 
since the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's Counter-
claim, and the Court having requested written argument i"mm tvioh 
party and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
so adduced, and the Court having made and entered herein its written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant be and they are hereby 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, with said Decree to become final upon 
signing and entry. 
2. Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, be and is hereby ordered 
to pay to Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, as temporary alimony the 
sum of $1,100.00 per month in two equal amounts on the 5th and 
20th day of each month commencing July 5, 1989 and continuing 
until Defendant reaches the age of Social Security retirement, 
age 65, or dies. 
3. Plaintiff, Anthony W. Rudman, be and is hereby awarded 
as his sole and separate property those assets of premarital 
ownership he held prior to this marriage and the marital assets, 
including, but not limited to: 
The condominium at 2560 Elizabeth Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah; the trailer park situated on 14 acres of land in Scofield, 
Utah; the 10.4 acres of Scofield land and the cabin situated 
thereon; the proceeds received from the sale of the Douglas 
Street triplex and Bonus Office Building sale; the Defendant's 
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partnership's interest .: the screens at Soda Springs, Mountain 
Home, Rupert, Prestor Hurley, Caldwel i >; 
Pocatello, Idaho; *.. v.: _ k o and bly s< ;*-.-- - Nevada; the 1'iavis 
Drive-In, known t- • -•*- -cinema Corp., and the triangle section of 
. .
 marriage; the Redwood Capitol and Cinema 
1 screens in Logan, known as Cache Amusement, Inc., the Ci nema II 
and Cinema III screens, also known as Cache Amusement, Inc.; the 
s c r e e n s i i i Mo i I t i c e ] ] o ,„ Mt. P 3 e a s an t, Roosevelt, and Ephr a i m, 
Utah; the nine (9) screeno :;. ..t. George known as M' vies I, II, 
and III; the Gaiety, -^^ ?)ix\*i. the Jtarii^h*- and Cinema , II 
and III; the sci eei is * • - : • -
Yellowstone, Montana screen; the P l a i n t i f f s „:\e~:..-i . : ,. :.erest in 
the condominium at St George, Utah; Plaintiff's S--* ownership in 
the corporation known as "' ' ^ " , i ' ' proceeds ini1 luter-st 
Plaintiff owns in Trolley Theatres, Trolley North, Trolley 
Corners, Trolco and the proceeds from the sale of Trolley Square; 
the St. George Bloomington Lor f I ; the Jeep W'agoneer, ; I he 1 lJ .'";;) 
Dodge truck and camper; the 1974 Ford horse truck; Plaintiff's 
j i-»wf' I i; \, i P 1 »:t i ri i i f f " s bank
 a c c o u r l t s ; the two horses ; a 11 o f the 
furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances present.ly i n i lie 
Plaintiff's control, wheresoever situate; and all of his premarital 
hunk accounts t'.snx irif-pd with I M H I nt I he business entities. 
I Defendant, Evelyn W. Rudman, be and Is hereby awaraea 
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as her sole and separate property, the marital and premarital 
assets as set forth herein: 
The home at 1515 Sumac Drive, Logan, Utah; the proceeds 
received from the sale of the Diet Center business; the Merry 
Maids business; the 1500 shares of Techno-Lab, Inc. stock; the 50 
shares of Prudential Financial Services stock; all of the 
furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances presently in her 
possession and under her control; her bank accounts and her 
personal effects and belongings. 
5. The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of 
$26,305.50 to equalize the division of the marital assets in this 
matter. 
6. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold 
Defendant harmless from all debts and obligations against those 
properties awarded Plaintiff in this matter, including the I.R.S. 
business debt secured against the Plaintiff's condominium, 
together with any debts he has incurred in his own name since the 
filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
7. Defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold 
Plaintiff harmless from all debts and obligations against those 
properties awarded Defendant in this matter together with any 
debts she has incurred in her own name since the filing of the 
Complaint in this matter. 
8. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to 
assume and pay their own attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
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9. The parties be and they are each hereby awarded those 
policies of life insurance on their life to do with as they 
choose. 
10. Plaintiff is ordered to cooperate in effecting the 
transfer of coverage under his health accident- a:: : 
hospitalization r^ d :-: *>.. - * > - * ' . ZCBR A 
legislation. Defendant is ordered t> a ^ ur.e and Ld\ a
 x 1 premium 
•-.: expenses for that coverage for the three years of 
time as provided by the federal 1 aw. 
11. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do 
M J perform - l 6 and things required by each of them 
to be done herein, 
DATED this
 T 
COURT! 
_C£_ clay o£p*»e/71989. 
(s BT'THF 
fRICT COUfiiT .FUDGE D DIST
onard H. Russon 
/^^f^C 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE this ^O 
day ot June, 14HS), In Urjvid S. Dolowitz, Attorney Tor Defendant, 
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
<3^*-6J ^ ^^e£^£j 
5 
EXHIBIT E 
EXHIBIT E 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
Agreement made this h day of April, 19 81, 
between Anthony W. Rudman and Evelyn Mohr, both of Salt 
I ake City, Utah. 
WH ERE AS , th e p a i f: i es a re c o n te mp 1 a t i n g marriage 
and establishing a home together as husband and wife? and 
WH E RE A S , a in, th e r e q ue s t o £ E ve 1 y n M o h r b u t w i th 
the :: o m m o i i ag re e men t o £ b oth p ar t i e s th ey de s i re to e n t e r 
into an agreement segregating the property accumulated by 
e a ch o f th em p r i or to th e ma r r i age , s e p a r a t e £ r om th e i :i: una r :L t a 1 
assets; and 
WHEREAS, they desire to make other provisions for 
the welfare of Evelyn Mohr in the event of "the death of 
Anthony W Ri id ma n,; n ow , th e re f o re 
IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
11 Each party hereby relinquishes and releases 
to the other their heirs representatives and assigns every 
right, claim and interest actual or contingent that: he or she 
might have with respect to property accumulated by the other 
prior to their marriage. It is agreed that said property shall 
not be deemed to be a marital asset of 'the parties follow,] ng 
the marriage. 
"This agreement is not intended and does not apply to 
any property which is accumulated by 'the parties either individually 
or jointly following the marriage of the parties. 
Because of the mutual concern of the parties 
t'oi the financial securi ty of Evel yn Mohr i r „ the event, of the 
death of Anthony W Rudma n A nthon^ W Ru iman agrees to 
purchase for Evelyn Mohr a life insurance policy in the 
face amount of $200,000 with Evelyn Mohr to be the owner 
thereof and to be an irrevocable beneficiary thereon and 
he further agrees to maintain said insurance policy during 
the period of the marriage of the parties. 
3. Anthony W. Rudman owns a condominium at 
2568 Elizabeth Street, #4, Salt Lake City, Utah. It is 
agreed that in the event of the death of Anthony W. Rudman 
the outstanding mortgage balance on said condominium shall 
be satisfied from the estate of Anthony Rudman and Evelyn 
Mohr is given the right to live in said condominium during 
her lifetime until her remarriage or until she voluntarily 
moves. At such time as Evelyn Mohr remarries or voluntarily 
moves, the condominium will then pass to the heirs of Anthony 
Rudman as provided in his will or by intestate succession 
should he die without a will. 
4. It is not intended that this agreement will in 
any way preclude either party from making provision for the 
other party by way of gift, creation of joint tenancy, owner-
ship of property, or by will. 
tl 
DATED this /ST - day of April, 19 81. 
Everyn Mohr 
Anthony Riidman 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
On the A£_"day of April, 19 81, personally appeared 
before me Evelyn Mohr, s igner of the foregoing Prenuptial 
Ag reemeii t , wh o J u 1 y a ck now 1 e d ge d t o roe tha t s he e xe c u te d 
the same. 
Commission /Expires : 
fm/fi 
Notary Pub l i c 
'Re s i d I n g I n S a 11 L ak e C o in 11y , Utah 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of Apri! ^ 8 1 personally appeared 
be f o re me An th on y Rudman, signer :: *.- n foregoing P r e n up t i a 1 
Agreement, who duly acknowledged t: ne tha- * - executed the 
same:. 
Commission Expires: 
CM M 
Notary Pub l i c 
Residing in S a l t Lake Coij111.;,- , Utah 
EXHIBIT F 
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H. Dixon HUndley. Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
TN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANTHONY 
vs, 
RUDMAN, 
EVELYN W. RUDMAN, 
Defendant 
RULING CLARIFICATION 
CIVIL NO. D-87-1691 
This matter came on for tri a] on August 18, 1988, At that 
time, a prenupt lei 1 ..K.)reeitient wvih1 f f ere- 1 and t'ece i yeei i nt-o 
evidence. Each party stipulated that the agreement - i> entered 
into by both parties voluntarily and without duress :- fraud. 
Each party asserted that 
unambiguous, and that the Court could rule - • : 
matter" of 1 aw of course i n each par ty's favor.. The Court gave 
its ruling, at which time both p a r t u s nio"eii n -i cont miidJK.e. 
The trial was continued until October 13, 1988, at 10:00 a,m, 
On further -• ::'
 e c t i o n , the court herein clarifies its 
ruling. 
The said prenuptial agreement clearly provides that each 
part"1/ lei inquishes -my Mini -ill! I. riqhl s t ;i 'my property accumulated 
by the other party prior to the marriage, and that fisaid property 
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shall not be deemed to be a marital asset of the parties 
following the marriage." 
The said agreement further clearly provides that the said 
agreement as stated above shall not apply to "any property" which 
is "accumulated" by the parties "either individually or jointly" 
following the marriage of the parties. The reasonable inference 
from the entire agreement is that any property accumulated after 
the marriage, whether accumulated individually or jointly, shall 
be considered marital property. 
The question arises, however, concerning acquisition of 
after-marriage accumulated property with before-marriage assets. 
In Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Co., 96 
Utah 403, 80 P.2d 458 (1938), the Utah Supreme Court in 
considering the definition of "accumulate" looked to Webster's 
definition, and stated that such definition implies no 
restriction as to the source of such accumulation. The court 
stated: 
Webster's definitions of "accumulate" as meaning 
"to heap up in a mass; to pile up; to collect or bring 
together; to amass; gather, store up, aggregate, 
hoard," etc., imply no restriction as to the source, 
means or methods of the accumulation. . . . 
If the above definition were to be followed, the prenuptial 
agreement would indicate that after-marriage acquired 
accumulation of property would be marital property regardless of 
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its source. However, a fair reading of the prenuptial agreement 
clearly separates prior marriage property from that property 
accumulated after the marriage. Therefore, this Court rules 
that property accumulated prior to the marriage, including any 
interest or increase in value of said property after the marriage; 
remains the property of that individual. 
However, where prior marriage property is merely rolled over 
into another asset, even if done so after the marriage, such 
remains the property of the original owner, and only that amount 
in excess thereof constitutes property "accumulated" after the 
marriage. In other words, $10,000.00 in a savings account prior 
to the marriage is not marital property, regardless of its 
increase in value during the marriage, but if that $10,000.00 is 
utilized to purchase common stock worth $10,000.00, while the 
value of the stock of $10,000.00 is not marital property, any 
increase in the value of that stock would be. Any property 
acquired after the marriage is marital, less that amount utilized 
for its acquisition that can be traced to a point prior to the 
marriage. 
Dated this of August, 1988. 
EEDNARDHTRUSSON >"\" 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON Hi?>iDLEY 
Cto.* 
By -$ ^9jJ.'TldU,UY 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Ruling Clarification, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this_ __day of August, 1988: 
Paul H. Liapis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Defendant 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
^ 
